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COMMUNICATION WITH REPRESENTED PERSONS:
THE DILEMMA OF DEFENDANT-INITIATED
CONTACTS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In September, 1989, Drug Enforcement Administration agents
arrested Jose Orlando Lopez after he attempted to sell them fifty
kilograms of cocaine and two kilograms of heroin.1 The arrest
culminated a lengthy undercover investigation which captured Lopez
acting as the chief negotiator for the drug sales on fifty audio and
video tapes.2
Detained without bail, Lopez sought to obtain release prior to
trial.3 Although he was willing to consider cooperating with the gov-
ernment,4 his attorney refused to represent him in any discussions
with the authorities that involved cooperation.' Subsequently, Lopez
contacted the prosecutor through his co-defendant's attorney.' Before
meeting with the prosecutor, he waived his right to counsel before a
United States magistrate.7 However, the district court, in an exercise
of its supervisory power, dismissed the indictment against him, citing
the government's flagrant disregard of the ethical rule which prohib-
* Editor's Note: On the eve of publication, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued
its decision on the government's appeal of United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D.
Cal. 1991), the facts of which have been used extensively in this comment to illustrate the
dilemma of defendant-initiated contacts. See United States v. Lopez, 93 C.D.O.S. 1901 (9th
Cir. March 17, 1993). This decision supports two propositions advanced by this comment.
First, the court indicates in dicta that, in an appropriate case, contact with a represented party
by a prosecutor is permissible by court order. Id. at 1903. Additionally, it acknowledges that
the ethical rule prohibiting contacts with represented persons does not bar contacts with
defendants who have waived their right to counsel. Id. at 1904. However, in dicta, the court
concludes that the prosecutor materially misled the magistrate judge into believing that Lopez'
attorney was being paid by a third party whose interests were inimical to Lopez', and that
Lopez did not waive his right to counsel. Id. at 1903-04. Finally, the court reinstates the
indictment against Lopez because it concludes that he was not substantially prejudiced by the
government's actions. Id. at 1904.
1. Appellant's Excerpt of Record at 2-5, 20, United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (Nos. 91-10274, 91-10393) [hereinafter Excerpt of Record].
2. Id.
3. United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1438 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
4. Id. at 1439-40.
5. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
7. Excerpt of Record, supra note 1, at 330-33.
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its an attorney from communicating with a represented person with-
out the consent of that person's counsel. 8
The ethical prohibition against an attorney communicating with
a party known to be represented by counsel is embodied in the
American Bar Association's Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility9 and Rule 4.2 of the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct."
Although courts are nearly unanimous in applying this ethical rule
to federal criminal prosecutors through their local rules, they do not
agree on the appropriate scope of the rule.
The district court's response in United States v. Lopez" is a
direct challenge to a Department of Justice policy that advocates a
narrow application of DR 7-104(A)(1), Rule 4.2 and their counter-
parts to federal prosecutors. 2 In June 1989, then-Attorney General
Dick Thornburgh issued a memorandum to Department of Justice
attorneys asserting that a broad application of the rule to federal
prosecutors was impeding federal criminal investigations.'" The
Thornburgh Memorandum maintains that when a represented per-
son desires to cooperate with the government and initiates contact
because of a belief that his attorney represents interests inimical to
8. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1463.
9 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1983).
10. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1990). This comment as-
sumes that Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104(A)(1) embody the general prohibition against communicat-
ing with represented persons, but recognizes that the text of the rule may vary in different
jurisdictions.
The formal position of the American Bar Association (hereinafter ABA) on legal ethics
from 1969 to 1983 is found in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (hereinafter
ABA Model Code). STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS - WITH RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 237 (1991). How-
ever, in 1977 the ABA appointed a Commission on the Evaluation of Professional Standards to
recommend revisions to the Code. Id. at 3. After making significant changes to the Model
Code, the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter ABA Model
Rules) in August 1983. Id. Thus, the ABA Model Rules represent the ABA's official position
on legal ethics from 1983 to the present. Id.
Since 1983, approximately 35 states have adopted some form of the ABA Model Rules,
while the remaining states have retained some form of the ABA Model Code. Id. at 3, 237.
Furthermore, many of those states that still retain the ABA Model Code are currently consid-
ering adopting the Model Rules. Id. at 237. Additionally, the standards governing the conduct
of Department of Justice attorneys incorporate the ABA Model Code. See 28 C.F.R.
§ 45.735-1(c).
11. 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
12. See infra notes 83-109 and accompanying text.
13. Memorandum from Dick Thornburgh to all Justice Department Litigators Re
Communication with Persons Represented by Counsel (June 8, 1989) (on file with SANTA
CLARA LAW REVIEW) [hereinafter Thornburgh Memorandum).
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his own, the rule does not apply.14
This comment examines whether defendant-initiated contacts
with a prosecutor are barred by DR 7-104(A)(1), Rule 4.2, or their
counterparts. Part II explores the policy reasons behind the rule and
discusses the different ways courts have applied it in a criminal con-
text. 5 Part III analyzes the nature of a defendant's rights under the
rule and whether it creates a right of the defendant's attorney that
cannot be waived by the defendant. 6 In particular, the impact of the
rule on a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is evalu-
ated." Finally, Part IV proposes to amend Rule 4.2 and its counter-
parts18 to allow a prosecutor to communicate with a defendant at the
defendant's initiative and after the defendant has appeared before a
judicial officer. 9
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Rule 4.2 and Its Counterparts
The ethical rule prohibiting an attorney's communication with
represented persons without the consent of that person's counsel has
been adopted in some form by nearly two-thirds of the United States
District Courts as part of their local rules.20 Virtually all these dis-
trict courts have adopted some variation of DR 7-104(A)(1) or
Model Rule 4.2.21
DR 7-104(A)(1) provides:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a
lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the
subject of the representation with a party he knows to be repre-
sented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior con-
sent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 20-183 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 184-217 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 199-217 and accompanying text.
18. This comment refers almost exclusively to Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104(A)(1) for sim-
plicity's sake because they are models for the ethical prohibition against communicating with a
represented party. However, the text of the rule may vary depending on the jurisdiction. See
supra note 10. Additionally, since Rule 4.2 is the ABA's most recent promulgation of the
ethical prohibition, DR 7-104(A)(1) cannot be revised by the ABA. See supra note 10. How-
ever, to the extent DR 7-104(A)(1) has been adopted by federal district courts in their local
rules, DR 7-104(A)(1) may be revised by them.
19. See infra notes 217-223 and accompanying text.
20. United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1454-55 n.40 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
21. Id.
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by law to do so.22
Essentially identical to DR 7-104, Model Rule 4.2 provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about
the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows
to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by
law to do so. 8
When included in a district court's local rules, the ethical prohibition
becomes federal law. 24
Both rules originate from the American Bar Association's Ca-
nons of 1908.25 Although the Canons did not contain a policy state-
ment for the prohibition against communicating with a represented
party, the ABA Model Code states that "[t]he legal system in its
broadest sense functions best when persons in need of legal advice or
assistance are represented by their own counsel."26
Supporters of the prohibition against communicating with a
represented party cite the protection of the client as one reason for
the prohibition's existence. According to this rationale, the rule pre-
vents an opposing attorney from "bamboozling" a party into giving
away his or her case without the protection of counsel.27 As one
court has noted, an uncounseled layperson has difficulty in "mar-
shalling the information and foresight required to conduct negotia-
tions about complex legal issues with a lawyer representing a party
22. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1983) (foot-
note omitted).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAl. CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1990).
24. In re Heriberto Medrano, 956 F.2d 101, 103 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating local rules
adopted by district court are federal law). See also Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 764 F. Supp.
328, 332 (E.D. Pa. 1991). The extent to which a local rule concerning contacts with repre-
sented persons regulates the out-of-court investigatory conduct of Justice Department attorneys
and whether such an application of the local rule may exceed the authority of the district court
under 28 U.S.C. § 2071 is beyond the intended scope of this comment. For a discussion of this
separation of powers issue see Eric Johnson, The Impact of Disciplinary Rule 7-104 on Law
Enforcement Contact With Represented Persons, 40 KAN. L. REV. 63 (1992).
25. John Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer's Client: The Lawyer's Veto
and the Client's Interest, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 683, 686 (1979). The Canons of Professional
Ethics were the ABA's first attempt at codifying ethical rules. STEPHEN GILLERS & RoY D.
SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS - WITH RECENT SU-
PREME COURT DECISIONS, xiii (1991). They remained in effect for over 60 years until the
ABA replaced them with the ABA Model Code. Id. See supra note 10. Canon 9 provided "[a]
lawyer should not in any way communicate with a party represented by counsel; much less
should he undertake or negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only
with his counsel." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 9 (1908).
26. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-18 (1983).
27. Leubsdorf, supra note 25, at 686.
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whose interests are, in some measure, adverse." 2 In addition, com-
mentators argue that Rule 4.2 and its counterparts further the settle-
ment of disputes by conveying them through dispassionate parties,29
and that it fosters consistent judicial procedures.3
Furthermore, courts have been concerned that negotiations be-
tween a party and opposing counsel conducted behind an attorney's
back will destroy the confidence essential to the attorney-client rela-
tionship. 1 Such negotiations may also hamper the attorney's ability
to represent the client in subsequent stages of the representation. 2
Thus, by placing the control of communications with a client in the
hands of his or her attorney, the rule enables a client to receive the
benefits of representation unhampered by his or her own legal igno-
rance. This in turn protects the client's interest in receiving the effec-
tive assistance of counsel. 8
Another reason for the prohibition is to protect the lawyer's in-
terest in retaining his client base. This is evident in the California
Rules of Professional Conduct, in which Rule 2-100, which prohib-
its communications with a represented party, appears in Chapter 2,
the chapter entitled "Relationship Among Members." ' 4 Justifica-
tions for the rule include fostering "ultraprofessional" relationships
and protecting lawyers' fees. 5 In addition, one commentator suggests
28. United States v. Batchelor, 484 F. Supp. 812, 813 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
29. Leubsdorf, supra note 25, at 686.
30. Marc A. Schwartz, Note, Prosecutorial Investigations and DR 7-104(AX), 89
COLUMB. L. REV. 940, 942 (1989).
31. United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1449 (N.D. Cal. 1991). But see Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct which permits an attorney to communicate with a
person represented by counsel if the communication is initiated by a client. TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN. Tit. 2, subtit. G-App., Art. 10 § 9, Rule 4.02 (West Supp. 1993). Under this rule, an
attorney (1) is permitted to communicate with another attorney's client as long as the first
lawyer does not cause or encourage the communication; and (2) is permitted to provide a
second opinion to a represented person who requests one. Id. at Rule 4.02 cmt. 2. The rule
does not impose an affirmative duty to discourage communications between the lawyer's client
and other represented persons. Id.
32. Batchelor, 484 F. Supp. at 813.
33. Bruce A. Green, A Prosecutor's Communications With Defendants: What Are the
Limits?, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 283, 285 (1988). An attorney has the duty to provide a client with
"competent" representation. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1990).
Rule 1.1 provides: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation." Id. Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a crimi-
nal defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The government violates this right when it interferes with a counsel's
ability to make independent decisions in conducting the defense. Id.
34. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2-100 (May 27, 1989). See
infra note 104 for text of Rule 2-100.
35. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 942.
1993]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
that the rule rescues lawyers from the conflict between their duty to
represent their client's interests and their duty not to overreach an
unprotected opposing party.86 Thus, Rule 4.2 and its counterparts
also protect the party's attorney from an overreaching opposing
counsel.
B. Applicability to Criminal Prosecutions
Although DR 7-104(A)(1) was drafted with civil practitioners
in mind, district courts have consistently applied it to prosecutors.3 7
In addition, several courts have extended the rule to federal agents
who are working with a prosecutor on an investigation because they
are considered to be the prosecutor's "alter ego." '38
Generally, courts have agreed that Rule 4.2 is not violated
when non-custodial, pre-indictment contacts occur. 9 For example in
United States v. Kenny,40 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held the use of an audio tape obtained by an agent through electronic
surveillance, even though the prosecutor knew of the surveillance
and he knew the suspect had retained counsel.' The court said
"[the government's use of such investigative techniques at this stage
36. Leubsdorf, supra note 25, at 687.
37. United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 735 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 152
(1990). See also In re John Doe, Esquire, 801 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.M. 1992).
38. Ryans, 903 F.2d at 735 (stating DR 7-104(A)(1) applies to agents of public prose-
cutors when they act as the "alter ego" of prosecuting attorneys). See also United States v.
Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 837-38 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating ethical prohibition may apply to non-
attorney government law enforcement officers). However, it is not clear that these cases actu-
ally bind non-lawyers to an ethical rule that governs the conduct of lawyers. For example,
Rule 4.2 prohibits an attorney from causing another to communicate with a represented party.
MODEl. RULF.S OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1990). Thus, the "alter ego" concept is
a means to hold attorneys accountable for the conduct of non-attorneys under their supervision
and is not intended to hold the non-attorneys liable for an ethical violation. See United States
v. Standard Drywall, 617 F. Supp. 1283, 1301 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding attorney not respon-
sible if agent acted on his own).
39. See Ryans, 903 F.2d at 740 ("DR 7-104(A)(1)'s proscriptions do not attach during
the investigative process before the initiation of criminal proceedings"); United States v. Sut-
ton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding DR 7-104 does not apply at the investiga-
tory stage before the initiation of any judicial proceedings); United States v. Dobbs, 711 F.2d
84, 86 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding FBI agent's noncustodial interview of defendant prior to initia-
tion of judicial proceedings was not ethical violation); United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328,
1333 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983) (holding pre-indictment use of informant to
gather information against represented suspect was not an ethical violation); United States v.
Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981) (holding ethical
considerations not implicated by pre-indictment investigative techniques); United States v.
Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974) (holding
disciplinary rule not applicable prior to indictment).
40. 645 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981).
41. Id. at 1339.
[Vol. 33
DEFENDANT-INITIATED CONTACTS
of a criminal matter does not implicate the sorts of ethical problems
addressed by the code."" 2
However, some courts have taken the position that DR 7-
104(A)(1) and its counterparts may apply in a custodial pre-indict-
ment setting.43 For example in United States v. Foley,44 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that some practices, such as pre-ar-
raignment interviews outside the presence of counsel, may violate
DR 7-104(A)(1) even though they may pass constitutional muster.45
In Foley, the prosecutor interviewed the defendant prior to his ar-
raignment and against the express request of the defendant's soon-to-
be appointed attorney."' The court indicated it was "troubled by the
practice" of pre-arraignment interviews because such interviews
"contravened the principles of DR 7-104(A)(1)," but declined to
hold the practice unethical. 7 Similarly, in United States v. Dur-
ham,48 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals suggested that an FBI
agent's pre-indictment interview with the defendant, who was in cus-
tody on another charge, raised "ethical questions" because the agent
conducted the interview without the knowledge of the suspect's
attorney. 9
One court has concluded that some situations may warrant ap-
plying DR 7-104(A)(1) to non-custodial, prie-indictment contacts. 0
In United States v. Hammad,51 the defendant was being investigated
by the grand jury for Medicaid fraud.52 In order to obtain incrimi-
nating evidence against Hammad, the prosecutor gave a cooperating
witness a sham grand jury subpoena and had him contact Hammad,
even though he was aware that Hammad was represented by counsel
for the purposes of the grand jury investigation. 53 Hammad en-
couraged the witness to lie to and withhold records from the grand
42. Id.
43. See United States v. Foley, 735 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1161 (1985). See also United States v. Durham, 475 F.2d 208, 211 (7th Cir. 1973).
44. Foley, 735 F.2d at 45.
45. Id. at 48.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 475 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1973).
49. Id. at 210.
50. United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988).
51. 858 F.2d at 834.
52. Id. at 835. In November 1985, an arsonist set the Hammad Department store in
Brooklyn on fire. Id. An investigation into the fire indicated that the owners of the store had
defrauded Medicaid in the amount of $400,000. Id. The government suspected that the fire
was set to destroy evidence, and initiated a grand jury investigation into the fraud. Id.
53. Id. at 835-36.
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jury.5" The district court found that DR 7-104(A)(1) applied before
Hammad was a target of the investigation and prior to his indict-
ment. 5 The court of appeals agreed.56 In its initial opinion, the ap-
pellate court refused to find that the rule attached at indictment be-
cause "a government attorney could manipulate grand jury
proceedings to avoid [the rule's] encumbrances." 57 However, it later
revised its opinion, expressing concern that its original opinion might
unduly hamper criminal investigations, particularly in cases where
career criminals have attempted to immunize themselves by hiring
"house counsel."" The court did not elaborate on the type of situa-
tions that may violate DR 7-104(A)(1). In particular, it noted that
where ethical standards are involved, such a delineation is best ac-
complished on a case-by-case basis." The court recognized that
"under DR 7-104(A)(1), a prosecutor is 'authorized by law' to em-
ploy legitimate investigative techniques in conducting or supervising
criminal investigations."' 0 Accordingly, it found that absent the kind
of misconduct that occurred in this case, the use of informants to
gather evidence in pre-indictment, non-custodial situations will gen-
erally fall within the ambit of such authorization. 1
While most courts have declined to apply DR 7-104(A)(1),
Model Rule 4.2 or its counterparts to criminal investigations prior to
the imposition of formal charges, they have differed on how to apply
the rule post-indictment. For example, in United States v. Mas-
siah,62 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found no violation of
DR 7-104(A)(1) in a post-indictment, undercover contact by a gov-
54. Id. at 836.
55. United States v. Hammad, 678 F. Supp. 397, 401 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
56. United States v. Hammad, 846 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1988).
57. Id. at 859. The circuit court implies that a prosecutor would attempt to delay a
grand jury indictment to avoid having to comply with the ethical prohibition.
58. United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988).
59. Id. at 840.
60. Id. at 839. Accordingly, cases interpreting Hammad have identified specific "author-
ized by law" exceptions to the rule. See United States v. Buda, 718 F. Supp. 1094, 1096
(W.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating taped conversations acquired through the use of an informant, pre-
indictment, and absent any prosecutorial misconduct fall within "authorized by law exception"
of DR 7-104(A)(1)); United States v. Chestman, 704 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (same).
See also United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating a prosecutor
is "authorized by law" to question a convicted defendant, known to be represented by counsel,
before a grand jury), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990).
61. Hammad, 858 F.2d at 840.
62. 307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The
Supreme Court overruled Massiah without reaching the ethical question. See infra notes 71-
74 and accompanying text.
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ernment agent.6 3 Although defendant Massiah was indicted, he was
released on bail. 64 Subsequent to his release, the agent placed a lis-
tening device in a co-defendant's car with the co-defendant's con-
sent." The co-defendant, Colson, was able to elicit incriminating
statements from Massiah, and those recorded conversations were
used against Massiah at trial." On appeal, Massiah argued that it
was a denial of his rights under DR 7-104(A)(1) "for any govern-
ment representative to procure and listen to his conversations with
Colson unless his lawyer was present."'67 The court of appeals dis-
agreed and asserted that the government had a duty to continue its
investigation because it was in the public's interest to ensure that all
involved would be prosecuted.68 It concluded that there was no con-
flict between this view and the ethical standard that forbids direct
communication between an attorney and another party represented
by counsel.69 The court noted that assuming "it would be improper
for a prosecutor to interview a criminal defendant under indictment
in the absence of his retained counsel, such a prohibition would not
require that government investigatory agencies also refrain from any
contact with a criminal defendant not in custody simply because he
had retained counsel."
7 0
Massiah was later reversed by the United States Supreme
Court, which found that the government's conduct violated Mas-
siah's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.7 The Court held that a
defendant has the right to counsel during post-indictment interroga-
tion." Therefore, Massiah's incriminating statements could not be
used against him at trial because federal agents deliberately and sur-
reptitiously elicited the statements from him after he had been in-
dicted and in the absence of counsel . 3 However, the majority did not
comment on the ethical considerations, and the dissent concluded that
the rule did not apply to investigators or other non-lawyers. 4
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in
63. Massiah, 307 F.2d at 66.
64. id.
65. Id. at 64.
66. Id. at 65.
67. Id. at 65-66.
68. Id. at 66.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citations omitted).
71. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 210 (White, J., dissenting).
19931
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United States v. Ryans 5 that the ethical prohibition applies, even to
non-lawyers, when the government initiates criminal proceedings. 6
In Ryans, an informant taped his conversations with the defendant
as part of a grand jury investigation. Several of the taped conversa-
tions disclosed advice given to Ryans by his attorney.78 Ryans sought
unsuccessfully to suppress the audio tapes at his trial, claiming a
violation of DR 7-104(A)(1). 79 The court found that because adver-
sarial proceedings had not begun, Ryans was not entitled to the pro-
tection of the rule.80 However, the court stated that while in this
situation the government interest in effective law enforcement out-
weighed the threat to the attorney-client relationship, there would
have been a different result if adversarial proceedings had begun.81
It concluded that "the purpose of the disciplinary rule is to prohibit
all communications between an attorney and a represented party,
but after initiation of adversary [sic] proceedings."82 Thus, the Ry-
ans court suggested that no post-indictment contacts are appropriate,
regardless of law enforcement objectives.
C. The Lopez Case
In United States v. Lopez,83 the district court ruled that it is an
ethical violation for a prosecutor to communicate with a defendant,
even when the defendant initiates the contact and a judicial officer
sanctions the communication.84 In Lopez, the defendant contacted the
prosecutor through his co-defendant's attorney and indicated that he
might be interested in a plea bargain.85 He did not wish to involve
his counsel because the attorney was unwilling to negotiate with the
government. 86 In a sworn affidavit to the court, Lopez' attorney
stated:
Under our agreement, if an offer of cooperation was presented
by the Assistant United States Attorney, I would convey that
offer to Mr. Lopez for his consideration. I would not, however,
75. 903 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 152 (1990).
76. Id. at 740.
77. Id. at 732.
78. Id. at 734.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 740.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 741.
83. 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
84. Id. at 1439-49.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1440.
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be personally involved in the continuing negotiations with the
government, since this conduct is personally, morally and ethi-
cally offensive to me. Since Mr. Lopez has retained me to vigor-
ously defend and try the case, another attorney would be willing
and better able to arrange his informant activities.
87
Additionally, Lopez' attorney stated that if Lopez wished to negoti-
ate with the government, he would find another attorney for him at
the additional cost of $2,000 to $3,000.88 However, according to the
co-defendant's lawyer, Lopez believed that his attorney would not
represent him at all if he cooperated with the government.89
The Assistant United States Attorney (hereinafter AUSA) had
reason to believe that Lopez' family had been threatened by the
criminal organization of which Lopez allegedly was a member.9"
The AUSA believed that the organization was paying for Lopez'
representation and that notifying his attorney of any discussions with
the government would further endanger Lopez' family.9
Two interviews were conducted at Lopez' request, but prior to
both interviews, and at the request of the AUSA, a United States
magistrate conducted an in camera interview with the defendant.92
Both times the magistrate conducted a lengthy interview with Lopez,
admonishing him of the risks of talking with the government without
counsel present. 93 In addition, the magistrate advised Lopez that
counsel could be appointed for the limited purpose of the interview
with the government.94 At the first interview, Lopez indicated at
least seven times that he understood his rights, and that he did not
wish to have a lawyer present because he didn't trust attorneys.95 At
both in camera hearings the magistrate read Lopez his Miranda
rights and Lopez executed a written waiver of the right to counsel
87. Id. at n.12.
88. Brief for the United States at 4 n.3, United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (Nos. 91-10274, 91-10393) (October 25, 1991) [hereinafter Appellate Brief].
89. Id. at 5 n.5.
90. United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1441 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
91. Id.
92. Excerpt of Record, supra note 1, at 305-06.
93. Id. at 310-46, 350-53.
94. Id. at 316, 350-52.
95. Id. at 324-27. In response to the magistrate's advisement that a new lawyer could be
appointed for him in his meeting with the government, Lopez remarked, "I don't trust no
lawyers. Do you - can't you understand? I don't trust no damn lawyers." Excerpt of Record,
supra note 1, at 318. Later in the proceedings he insisted, "I understand. I understand and
appreciate very much what you're trying to make me understand, and everything. I do. I
appreciate it very much .... But I have - I have not heard of anybody that's done any better
with lawyers. I have not." Excerpt of Record, supra note 1, at 319-20.
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for the purposes of his discussions with the government. 96
After Lopez executed his waiver of the right to counsel, the
AUSA indicated that he would not use any of Lopez' statements
made in the interview against him.9" Additionally, prior to each
meeting, the AUSA again advised Lopez of his Miranda rights and
warned him that he should have counsel present.98 At the first meet-
ing, Lopez asked whether cooperating with the government would
result in his release so that he could be with his children, and
whether the government could offer him protection if he cooper-
ated.99 At the second meeting, Lopez gave two names of people about
whom he could provide information."' 0 Other than the provision of
the two names, Lopez did not make any incriminating statements at
either interview. 1'
Subsequently, Lopez' attorney became aware of the discussion
and withdrew from the case.'0 2 Lopez obtained a new attorney and
filed a motion to dismiss the indictment.' He argued that the gov-
ernment's conduct violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and also violated Rule 2-100 of the California Rules of Professional
Conduct' "4  which prohibited communication with represented
96. Excerpt of Record, supra note 1, at 330-33, 353.
97. Id. at 336, 353.
98. Id. at 136, 678.
99. United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1442 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
100. Id. at 1443.
101. Appellate Brief, supra note 88, at 10, 12.
102. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1444.
103. Id.
104. CA.IFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2-100 (May 27, 1989)
provides:
(A) While representing a.client, a member shall not communicate directly
or indirectly about the subject of the representation with a party the member
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the member
has the consent of the other lawyer.
(B) For purposes of this rule, a "party" includes:
(1) An officer, director, or managing agent of a corporation or association, and a
partner or managing agent of a partnership; or
(2) An association member or an employee of an association, corporation, or
partnership, if the subject of the communication is any act or omission of such
person in connection with the matter which may be binding upon or imputed to
the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement
may constitute an admission on the part of the organization.
(c) This rule shall not prohibit:
(1) Communications with a public officer, board, committee, or body;
(2) Communications initiated by a party seeking advice or representation from
an independent lawyer of the party's choice; or




The district court did not find a Sixth Amendment violation be-
cause Lopez was able to retain new counsel when his initial counsel
withdrew from the case.' However, the court did conclude that the
government violated Rule 2-100, even though it was Lopez who ini-
tiated the contact.' The court noted that "[c]ourts have consistently
ruled that the ethical prohibition bars a prosecutor from communi-
cating with a represented individual without his or her counsel even
if it is the individual who makes the first contact."' ' Finding that
the prosecutor intentionally violated the ethical prohibition embodied
in the court's local rules, the court dismissed the indictment against
Lopez."9
D. The Thornburgh Memorandum
The district court's dismissal of the indictment in Lopez was a
consequence of the official Department of Justice policy which advo-
cates exempting federal prosecutors from the dictates of DR 7-
104(A)(1) and Model Rule 4.2 when compliance would impede their
federal law enforcement responsibilities. "0 In June 1989, then-At-
torney General Dick Thornburgh issued a policy memorandum stat-
ing that DR 7-104(A)(1), Rule 4.2 and its counterparts were not
applicable to Justice Department attorneys because their law en-
forcement responsibilities fell within the "authorized by law" excep-
tion."' He asserted that "where the Constitution and federal law
105. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1444.
106. Id. at 1456. The court did not address the issue of whether Lopez was denied
counsel for the purposes of the interviews with the government. Rather, the court's Sixth
Amendment analysis focused on whether the government's actions deprived Lopez of his right
to chosen counsel. d. at 1455-56. However, the court did indicate that Lopez' waiver was not
valid because he did not have standing to waive an ethical rule. See infra note 125 and accom-
panying text.
107. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1451.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1460.
110. Id. at 1461.
111. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 13, at 2. Recently, the Department of Jus-
tice has attempted to strengthen this policy by proposing comprehensive new administrative
regulations that would permit Department attorneys to have contact with represented persons
under certain proscribed circumstances. See 57 Fed. Reg. 54737 (November 20, 1992). Pursu-
ant to 5 U.S.C. § 301, the Attorney General has the power to promulgate regulations gov-
erning the conduct of Justice Department attorneys. The proposed rules would amend chapter
I of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations by adding a new part 77. 57 Fed. Reg. at
52741. The adoption of these regulations has been put on hold by the incoming Clinton ad-
ministration pending further study. Memorandum from Leon E. Panetta to Heads and Acting
Heads of Agencies Re Regulatory Revisions (January 22, 1993) (on file with SANTA CLARA
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permit legitimate investigative contact, DR 7-104 does not present
an obstacle .... [I]t is the Department's position that contact with a
represented individual in the course of authorized law enforcement
activity does not violate DR 7-104.""'
Thornburgh argues that the issue arises in several contexts:
(a) instances of covert contacts with a suspect by undercover
agents or informants, or (less frequently) overt interviews by in-
vestigators or attorneys, after the suspect has retained counsel;
or
(b) instances of multiple representation, where a single attorney
represents either several individuals (one of whom is the princi-
ple target and is paying for everyone's representation) or an or-
ganization and all its employees (when the organization is the
target and is paying for the representation), and where the at-
torney insists that all contacts by prosecutors or agents must
come through him, even if initiated by one of the "represented"
individuals."'
This comment is particularly concerned with his assertion that a
prosecutor may communicate directly with a represented person who
initiates contact.
Such communications generally arise when the represented
party wishes to cooperate but fears that his or her attorney will no-
LAW REvIEw). If and when these regulations are adopted, they will have the force of federal
law and will arguably fall within the "authorized by law" exception embodied in most ver-
sions of the rule. However, the proposed regulations may conflict with a court's local rule if it
does not contain the "authorized by law" exception. See e.g. N.D. Fla. Local Rule 4(G)(1).
FLORIDA RULES OF COURT, FEDERAL 123 (West 1992).
112. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 13, at 7. At least one jurisdiction has
amended its ethical rules to accommodate the Department of Justice's position. The District of
Columbia's rule regarding communication with represented persons provides:
This Rule is not intended to regulate the law enforcement activities of the
United States or the District of Columbia. A body of law has been developed
that recognizes both the authority of the government to seek to obtain statements
from a suspect, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of the suspect. The
Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to government conduct that is valid
under this body of law. Generally speaking, Rule 4.2 will apply once a defend-
ant is formally charged, elects to be represented by counsel, and obtains or is
appointed counsel. But there are situations in which a defendant who is repre-
sented by counsel will seek to communicate with the government without de-
fense counsel's being aware of the communication. Some communications will
serve to protect the defendant and to identify sham representations. Although
communications between charged defendants and the government without notice
to defense counsel must be viewed with suspicion, such communications cannot
be prohibited in all instances.
D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 cmt. 8 (1991).
113. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 13, at 2 (emphasis added).
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tify the other defendants or the criminal organization that is paying
for the attorney's services. 11' An example of how closely an attorney
may be aligned with such a criminal organization is United States v.
Cintolo,"' in which an attorney was convicted of obstruction of jus-
tice for preventing his client from testifying before the grand jury.1 6
Cintolo was an attorney hired by Gennaro Anguilo, a reputed mob
boss, to represent Walter LaFreniere in a grand jury investiga-
tion."' LaFreniere possessed damaging information linking various
members of the Anguilo organization to illegal gambling and loan-
sharking activities. 16 Cintolo was hired to keep him from testifying
truthfully before the grand jury. 9 At one point Anguilo ordered, in
Cintolo's presence, that LaFreniere be killed. 2  Although LaFre-
niere was not killed, Cintolo was successful in preventing him from
testifying.12 1
If a represented person initiates contact under these circum-
stances, Department of Justice policy is to advise the represented
party to consult with alternative counsel. 22 In the event the party
cannot afford additional counsel, the Department encourages the in-
dividual to seek court-appointed counsel so the party may receive the
benefit of legal advice without advertising his or her cooperation.'2 3
The government attorney should seek the intervention of a judicial
officer whenever possible.124
However, the Lopez court found these measures to be an inade-
114. Memorandum from Edward S. G. Dennis, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney General to
all Justice Department Litigators Re Contacts With Represented Persons 1 (September 19,
1989) (on file with SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW).
115. 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913 (1987).
116. Id. at 988.
117. Id. at 984.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 984.
120. Id. at 985.
121. Id. at 988; see also United States v. Stuckey, 917 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1990). In
Stuckey, the defendants were drug couriers for a large drug-trafficking syndicate. Id. at 1538.
The court disqualified one attorney because it concluded that he had been hired by the syndi-
cate to prevent the defendants from cooperating with the government and revealing the identi-
ties of those in the syndicate who gave them their "marching orders." Id. at 1542-43. The
court concluded that "[sluch control can be devastating to the rights of an accused; rather than
getting credit through a charge bargain with the prosecutor or a reduced sentence from the
trial judge, the accused stands mute and takes all the blame." Id. at 1543.
122. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 13, at 6; see also Unites States Attorney's
Manual § 9-13.253 (on file with SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW) [hereinafter USAM].
123. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 13, at 6; see also USAM, supra note 122,
§ 9-13.253.
124. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 13, at 6; see also USAM, supra note 122,
§ 9-13.257.
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quate substitute for compliance with the ethical rule prohibiting con-
tacts with represented persons.'25 Rather, the court concluded that
the Thornburgh Memorandum advises Department of Justice attor-
neys to ignore an ethical prohibition adopted by district courts across
the United States: "The government misconduct at issue is thus the
result of an explicit policy of the Attorney General of the United
States which promises to wreak havoc in federal trial courts every-
where." '26 Furthermore, the court held that the waiver executed by
Lopez before the magistrate was invalid because "the ethical prohi-
bition applies to attorneys and is designed in part to protect their
effectiveness, [and] a represented party may not waive it.' 2 7
E. Other Courts' Treatment of Defendant-Initiated Contacts
Other courts have also found that post-indictment contacts initi-
ated by the defendant violate DR 7-104(A)(1) and its counterparts
regardless of whether the defendant waived the right to have counsel
present during the interview. 28 For example, in United States v.
Partin,2 a former codefendant, Sykes, contacted the prosecutor af-
ter his conviction was affirmed on appeal and indicated his willing-
ness to testify against Partin. Sykes and Partin had the same attor-
ney, and Sykes feared for his own safety should the attorney be
notified. 3 Signing a waiver of his right to counsel, Sykes gave two
statements to the FBI. 3' Subsequently, Partin was convicted with
the use of Sykes' testimony.' 2 On appeal, Partin argued that the
district court should have suppressed the statements because they
were made in violation of DR 7-104(A)(1).' 33 The court of appeals
agreed that a violation had occurred, but refused to reverse Partin's
conviction. 3 It concluded that the ethical duty owed to Sykes by the
prosecutor was a personal one.'3 5 Consequently, Partin did not have
the standing to challenge the violation of the prosecutor's ethical duty
125. United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1461 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1452.
128. United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 964
(1980); United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
129. Partin, 601 F.2d at 1005.









In United States v. Thomas, 3' the defendant contacted the case
agent and requested an interview." Without the knowledge of
Thomas' attorney, the agent obtained a Miranda waiver and a writ-
ten statement from Thomas which was later used in his trial during
cross-examination.'8 9 On appeal, the court stated that once a crimi-
nal defendant has counsel, any statement obtained in an interview
may not be offered in evidence for any purpose unless the accused's
attorney was notified and was given a reasonable opportunity to be
present. "To hold otherwise, we think, would be to overlook conduct
which violated both the letter and the spirit of the canons of ethics.
This is obviously not something which the defendant alone can
waive. '"140 Nevertheless, the court affirmed Thomas' conviction be-
cause the question was an ethical one governing the conduct of attor-
neys practicing before the United States courts and did not present a
problem of constitutional dimensions. "'
F. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
As discussed above, one of the justifications for DR 7-104(A)(1)
and Rule 4.2 is to ensure the effective assistance of counsel, a right
also guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. " 2 Consequently, the ethi-
cal issue of communicating with a represented party often arises in
the same factual context as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Accordingly, the courts that have discussed the ethical concerns sur-
rounding post-indictment contacts with defendants have also consid-
ered whether the government's conduct violated the accused's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel..' In order to better understand the
relationship between the ethical prohibition embodied in Rule 4.2
and the Sixth Amendment, it is necessary to examine the protections
136. Id.
137. 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
138. Id. at 111.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 112 (emphasis added).
141. Id. See also State v. Morgan, 646 P.2d 1064 (Kan. 1982). In Morgan, the defend-
ant asked to speak with a county attorney while still in the courtroom after his first appear-
ance. Id. at 1068. The defendant waived his right to remain silent and to have his counsel
present. Id. Soon after he made a statement incriminating himself which was used against him
at trial. Id. The court concluded that an ethical violation had occurred, but found that the
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility prescribe standards of conduct for law-
yers and "are not constitutional or statutory rights guaranteed to individual persons." Id. at
1069 (quoting People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448 (Mich. 1979)).
142. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 62-82 and accompanying text.
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afforded by the Sixth Amendment in post-indictment interviews and
a defendant's ability to waive such protections.
It is well settled that a defendant has the Sixth Amendment
right to the assistance of counsel during post-indictment interviews
with the government."' Should the defendant invoke this right, the
government must cease interrogation altogether.14 However, the de-
fendant may be interviewed if he or she waives the right to counsel
prior to formally invoking it or if he or she initiates the communica-
tion.146 If a defendant chooses to waive the right to counsel, he or she
may do so solely for the purpose of post-indictment questioning
without prejudicing the right in future proceedings.' 47
In United States v. Mohabir,48 the Second Circuit held that a
Sixth Amendment waiver of counsel must conform to a higher stan-
dard than a Fifth Amendment waiver. 49 In Mohabir, the defendant
had been indicted but had not retained counsel. 5 On the advice of a
co-defendant's attorney, Mohabir contacted the prosecutor.'
Mohabir confessed after the prosecutor advised him of his Miranda
rights and Mohabir's statements were used against him at trial. 52
The court of appeals ruled that Mohabir's waiver was not valid be-
cause a Sixth Amendment waiver must conform to a "higher stan-
dard" than a Fifth Amendment waiver, and that it must be preceded
by "a federal judicial officer's explanation of the content and signifi-
cance of this right.' 53
In Patterson v. Illinois,15 4 the Court rejected the Mohabir
court's argument that a Sixth Amendment waiver of counsel should
be more difficult to execute than a Fifth Amendment waiver of coun-
sel.' 5  In Patterson, the defendant executed a Miranda waiver in an
144. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 (1988).
145. Id. at 291.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 293 n.5.
148. 624 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1980).
149. Id. at 1153. The Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination includes
the right to request the presence of counsel during custodial interrogation by the government
prior to the imposition of criminal charges. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In
contrast, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches after the imposition of criminal pro-
ceedings. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 (1986). Additionally, the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel includes the right to have the assistance of counsel at every "critical stage" of
the prosecution. Id. at n.5.
150. Mohabir, 624 F.2d at 1145.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1153.
154. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
155. Id. at 296-97.
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interview with a prosecutor prior to his arraignment and his state-
ments were used against him at trial. 56 On appeal, Patterson argued
that a Miranda warning was not sufficient to execute a knowing and
intelligent waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 5
The Supreme Court found that the scope of the right to counsel is
defined by "a pragmatic assessment of the usefulness of counsel to
the accused at the particular proceeding, and the dangers to the ac-
cused of proceeding without counsel."' 58 The Patterson Court did
not find a substantial difference between the usefulness of counsel
during pre-indictment custodial interrogation and his value to the
accused after indictment." 9 It held that "an accused who is admon-
ished with the warning prescribed by this Court in Miranda has
been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment
rights, and of the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that
his waiver on this basis will be considered a knowing and intelligent
one."' 60 Thus, the Patterson Court concluded that whatever warn-
ing was satisfactory under Miranda was sufficient for a Sixth
Amendment waiver. 6 '
However, the Court also observed that because the Sixth
Amendment protects the right to rely on counsel as a "medium" be-
tween the defendant and the State, it extends beyond Miranda's pro-
tections once a defendant has counsel.' 2 The Court commented that
it was significant that "petitioner had not retained, or accepted by
appointment, a lawyer to represent him at the time he was ques-
tioned by authorities. Once an accused has a lawyer, a distinct set of
constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the at-
torney-client relationship takes effect."' 63 This means that once a de-
fendant has been indicted and has asserted his right to the assistance
of counsel, the government may not knowingly circumvent this
right.'64
In an earlier case, Maine v. Moulton," 5 the Supreme Court
held that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when, by luck or hap-
156. Id. at 289.
157. Id. at 299-300.
158. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298 (1988).
159. Id. at 298-99.
160. Id. at 296 (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 298.
162. Id. at 297 n.9.
163. Id. at 290 n.3 (citations omitted).
164. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964); see supra notes 62-74 and
accompanying text.
165. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
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penstance, the State obtains incriminating statements from a defend-
ant after the right to counsel has attached.1"' "However, knowing
exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused
without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State's obli-
gation not to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is
the intentional creation of such an opportunity.' 7 Accordingly, the
Moulton Court noted that in some cases a valid waiver of the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel under Miranda would not suffice under
the Sixth Amendment.' For example, the Supreme Court has up-
held a Fifth Amendment Miranda waiver where the government
failed to inform a suspect that his lawyer was trying to reach him
during questioning.169 If the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had
attached, this waiver would not be valid.' Likewise, a surreptitious
conversation between an undercover agent and an unindicted suspect
would not violate Miranda as long as the interview was not custo-
dial.17 1 However, if the suspect were indicted, the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel would prohibit such questioning. 72 Thus, unlike the
Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment protects the attorney-client
relationship in addition to the right to counsel.'
The Sixth Amendment's protection of the attorney-client rela-
tionship is not absolute; it also permits the defendant to reject the
attorney's assistance.' 74 For example, in Faretta v. California,"" the
state court forced the defendant to accept a state-appointed public
defender and prevented him from conducting his own defense.' 6
The United States Supreme Court reversed, remarking,
What were contrived as protections for the accused should not
be turned into fetters .... To deny an accused a choice of proce-
dure in circumstances in which he, though a layman, is as capa-
ble as any lawyer of making an intelligent choice, is to impair
the worth of great Constitutional safeguards by treating them as
empty verbalisms.
166. Id. at 176.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424, 428 (1986).
170. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 296 n.9.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. 297 n.9
174. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 1654 pro-
vides that all litigants in federal court may personally conduct their own cases. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654 (1988).
175. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
176. Id. at 810-11.
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... When the administration of the criminal law is hedged
bout [sic] as it is by the Constitutional safeguards for the protec-
tion of an accused, to deny him in the exercise of his free choice
the right to dispense with some of these safeguards ...is to
imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution.
17 7
The Court reasoned that an attorney's authority rests in the defend-
ant's consent to have the attorney as his or her representative.' 7 8 Ab-
sent this consent, counsel's training and experience works imper-
fectly. 7 9 The Court stated that the right to defend is personal as it is
the defendant and not his lawyer or the state who will bear the per-
sonal consequences of a conviction. 8 Therefore, the defendant must
be free to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his ad-
vantage.' 8 Even though "he may conduct his own defense ultimately
to his own detriment; his choice must be honored out of 'that respect
for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.' "182
The Faretta Court concluded that denying a defendant the
right to self-representation violates the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.' 8 3 Thus, if a court's interpretation of DR 7-104(A)(1) and
Rule 4.2 prevents a defendant from exercising this right to self-rep-
resentation, then the ethical issue of communicating with represented
persons becomes one of constitutional dimensions. The question then
becomes who may waive the protections of the ethical rule and how
may it be done properly.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Benefits Conferred by Rule 4.2 on the Attorney
Some courts have held that Rule 4.2 and its counterparts cannot
be waived by the defendant because they protect the attorney's inter-
ests. 8 For example, the Lopez court found that the rule prohibiting
177. Id. at 815 (quoting Adams v. United States ex. rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279-80
(1942)).
178. Id. at 820-21.
179. Id. at 834.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
183. Id. at 836.
184. United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1991); United States
v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1980). See also United States
v. Batchelor, 484 F. Supp. 812, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (stating DR 7-104 presupposes a differ-
ent model than waiver by the defendant).
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communication with represented parties applies only to attorneys.' 80
Additionally, the Thomas court indicated that a defendant could not
waive the rule alone.' 86 Even the language of the rule itself, by al-
lowing communication only with the consent of the attorney, sug-
gests that it can be waived only by the attorney.'
8 7
Undeniably, the rule prohibiting communication with a repre-
sented party benefits attorneys in some respects. The ability to pre-
vent opposing counsel from communicating with a client reduces the
possibility that an opposing counsel will impair a client's confidence
in his or her attorney.' 88 Furthermore, negotiations with opposing
counsel are legitimate tasks to be billed to the client.' 9 Finally, and
most importantly, giving an attorney control regarding communica-
tions with a client assures that he or she has complete knowledge of
all that has transpired in a client's case. An attorney has an interest
in his or her own effectiveness and compliance with DR 7-104(A)(1)
protects this interest. 9 °
B. Benefits Conferred by Rule 4.2 on the Defendant
Rule 4.2 and its counterparts do not exist in a vacuum; they
also confer important benefits on the defendant. A defendant with
little or no experience with the criminal justice system may have
great difficulty judging when it is in his or her own best interest to
talk with the government.' 9 ' An uncounseled defendant risks making
damaging admissions in interviews with the government that may
later be used against him or her at trial. For example, in United
States v. Thomas,'9 2 the defendant contacted the case agent, executed
a Miranda waiver, and made inculpatory statements that were later
used against him during cross-examination.' 93 Such damaging state-
ments may ultimately discourage defendants from taking the stand in
their own defense," or cause them to plead guilty instead of going
to trial. Thus, an uncounseled defendant stands to lose a great deal
185. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1452.
186. Thomas, 474 F.2d at 112.
187. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1983);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1990).
188. Batchelor, 484 F. Supp. at 813.
189. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
191. Batchelor, 484 F. Supp. at 813.
192. 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1980).
193. Id. at 111.




when talking to the government.
Furthermore, while an attorney may have an interest in his or
her own effectiveness, the client has an even greater interest in that
effectiveness as under the Sixth Amendment there is a constitutional
right to the effective assistance of counsel.' 95 An attorney who has
personal knowledge of all that has transpired with the government is
in a better position to provide this kind of assistance. Additionally,
the presence of an attorney may make a defendant less vulnerable to
psychological manipulation by the government. 96 Generally, an at-
torney who can prevent a defendant from talking to the government
may provide the defendant with more defense options in the long
run. Thus, to the extent that Rule 4.2 and its counterparts protect an
attorney's effectiveness, they actually protect the defendant's consti-
tutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.
The idea that the ethical prohibition actually protects the de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel is consistent with courts' application of the rule in criminal cases.
Most courts have refused to apply the rule pre-indictment and in-
stead apply it when the government initiates judicial criminal pro-
ceedings against the defendant. 197 If the protection of the attorney
were paramount, then courts would see a need to apply Rule 4.2
pre-indictment. Yet courts consistently rule that prior to the return
of an indictment, law enforcement objectives outweigh the impact to
the attorney-client relationship.'98
C. Impact of Rule 4.2 on the Defendant's Right to Counsel
If Rule 4.2 and its counterparts cannot be waived by the de-
fendant, then it interferes with the defendant's ability to waive his or
her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The requirement of ob-
taining the attorney's consent before a client communicates with the
government' 99 limits the client's ability to waive counsel when he or
she believes the attorney does not represent his or her best interests.
On the one hand, Rule 4.2 does not prevent a defendant from waiv-
ing counsel if the defense attorney interprets the rule to mean that
195. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
196. Foley, 735 F.2d at 48.
197. See supra notes 37-61 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 37-61 and accompanying text.
199. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 4.2 (1990). "[A] lawyer
shall not communicate ... with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer
in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer . Id. (emphasis
added).
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consent must be given if the client so directs. If the client intends to
waive the right to counsel, the attorney could counsel against such a
waiver, but would respect the client's wishes and consent to the in-
terview with the government. However, the rule becomes a problem
in cases where the defendant fears for his or her life should the at-
torney be alerted to his or her cooperation.200 In such cases, a strict
construction of Rule 4.2 could block a defendant's attempt to re-
present himself or herself in discussions with the government by giv-
ing such an attorney the opportunity to withhold consent and effec-
tively veto the defendant's decision to waive counsel.
The concept of allowing a defense attorney to have veto power
over a defendant's decision to waive Sixth Amendment rights is con-
trary to the notion that a defendant has a constitutional right to self-
representation. In Faretta, the Court found the right to counsel to be
a personal one.2"1 "An unwanted counsel 'represents' the defendant
only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the
accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented
is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very
real sense, it is not his defense."20
If a defendant has the right to represent himself or herself at
trial, it does not make sense to prevent him or her from representing
himself or herself during post-indictment questioning where the dan-
gers and disadvantages of self-representation are "less substantial
and more obvious to an accused than they are at trial."203 Further-
more, the right to self-representation exists even if exercising it
would not be in the defendant's best interest. The Faretta court rec-
ognized that in most criminal prosecutions, a defendant is better off
with the guidance of counsel.20 4 However, it felt that in rare in-
stances a defendant may be a more effective advocate for himself or
herself than a hired representative.20 5 Since it was the defendant who
faced the personal consequences of a possible conviction, the judicial
system should respect his or her election.206
As previously discussed, it is a risk for a defendant to deal with
the government alone.207 However, in some situations, it may be ad-
200. See infra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
201. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
202. Id. at 820.
203. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 299 (1988).
204. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 33
DEFENDANT-INITIATED CONTACTS
vantageous for a defendant to approach the government without his
or her attorney's knowledge. In Lopez, even assuming that the de-
fendant was not in physical danger, his attorney's categorical refusal
to assist him in the event he decided to cooperate impeded Lopez'
ability to decide whether a plea bargain was a viable option.208 This
is because Lopez believed he would be without any representation if
his attorney discovered his interest in talking with the AUSA.209
However, the decision of whether to plea bargain is reserved for the
defendant, not the attorney.210 Lopez' attorney may have been "mor-
ally and ethically" offended by Lopez' informant activities, but it
was Lopez who faced the possibility of a conviction at trial. The
evidence against Lopez was such that it was reasonable for him to
consider cooperation as an option.21 Communicating through Lopez'
attorney would have discouraged Lopez from pursuing the possibility
of a plea bargain-a decision that he should be able to make without
the threat of losing representation altogether.
Furthermore, in organized crime cases, communication with the
government without the attorney's consent could save the defendant's
life. For example in Lopez, if the AUSA's information was correct,
Lopez' real fear may have been for the safety of himself and his
family and not that he would lose his attorney.2"2 As the case of
United States v. Cintolo 213 dramatically demonstrates, the attorney
may actually represent the larger criminal organization.2"" A defend-
ant may wish to cooperate for any number of reasons, including ex-
208. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
210. Although the ethical duties of defense attorneys are beyond the scope of this com-
ment, it is interesting to note that the ABA Model Rules provide that "[i]n a criminal case, the
lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with a lawyer, as to a plea to be
entered, whether to waive a jury trial, and whether the client will testify." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.2(a) (Scope of Representation) (1991). The commen-
tary to that rule states that "the client may not be asked to agree ... to surrender ... the right
to settle litigation that the lawyer might wish to continue." Id. at cmt 5. Furthermore, the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice advise that "li]t is unprofessional conduct for the lawyer
intentionally to understate or overstate the risks, hazards, or prospects of the case to exert
undue influence on the accused's decision as to his or her plea." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE § 5.1(b) (1980). Finally, DR 7-101(A)(1) provides, "[a] lawyer shall not inten-
tionally . . . [f]ail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available
means." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1983). Thus,
the decision of whether or not to enter into a plea bargain is exclusively the defendant's and
any attempt by the attorney to unduly influence the defendant's decision is arguably an ethical
violation.
211. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
213. 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913 (1987).
214. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
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tracting himself from the organization or reducing his sentence.
However, it is unlikely that an attorney hired by the organization to
restrict the flow of information to the government would permit co-
operation. In Cintolo, the mere possibility that the client, LaFre-
niere, would testify truthfully before the grand jury resulted in the
Anguilo organization placing a death sentence on him with the
knowledge and acquiescence of his attorney.2" 5 Notifying such an at-
torney that his client wished to cooperate with the government could
endanger the client's life.
Consequently, even if the ethical prohibition confers rights on
the attorney, a strict construction of Rule 4.2 may prevent the de-
fendant from exercising a constitutional right. Although an ethical
rule adopted by the court may have the effect of federal law,216 it
cannot supersede constitutional principles.217 Thus, the rule must be
interpreted in a way that does not conflict with the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to self-representation.
IV. PROPOSAL
The interests DR 7-104(A)(1) and Rule 4.2 protect are valid.
These rules protect a defendant's right to the effective assistance of
counsel and decrease the likelihood that a defendant may incriminate
himself or herself.21 ' However, an outright ban on defendant-initi-
ated contacts prevents a defendant from exercising the constitutional
right to self-representation.
One option is for courts to interpret defendant-initiated contacts
as falling within the "authorized by law" exception that appears in
most versions of the ethical rule. However, this is not to suggest that
prosecutors are "authorized by law" to communicate with defendants
who initiate contact solely because of their general authority to en-
force the law as the Thornburgh Memorandum asserts.2"9 Rather,
because the Constitution authorizes a defendant to represent himself
or herself, it also "authorizes" the prosecutor to respect that right.
Courts which have adopted a rule barring contacts with a rep-
resented person should interpret it to allow defendant-initiated con-
215. Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 986.
216. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
217. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978) (holding bar rule that infringes on
constitutional right is invalid); cf Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2734 (1991)
(plurality opinion) (stating disciplinary rules cannot punish activity protected by the First
Amendment).
218. See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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tacts with the government after the defendant has met with a judicial
officer in camera. The judicial officer would advise the defendant of
his or her constitutional rights and either have the defendant execute
a waiver of counsel or appoint counsel for the purposes of the inter-
view with the government. A judicial officer is better situated than a
prosecutor to discern a defendant's actual intentions because he or
she is not the adversary of the defendant. Furthermore, a judicial
hearing would guarantee that the proceedings were preserved in a
transcript, facilitating review if necessary. However, such proceed-
ings should remain confidential so that the defendant could act with-
out the fear of reprisals.
This procedure is similar to the one proposed in United States
v. Mohabir,"2 O but would occur in instances where the defendant al-
ready has counsel. 22' The intervention of a judicial officer ensures
that the government does not circumvent a defendant's right to coun-
sel. These additional requirements for executing a Sixth Amendment
waiver are consistent with the Supreme Court's recognition that the
attorney-client relationship is a protected interest.222 Accordingly, the
dissent in Patterson suggested that contacts with a represented per-
son were allowable with the permission of the court.22
Another option is for courts to revise their ethical rules prohib-
iting communication with represented persons. For example, Rule
4.2 should be amended as underlined:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate
about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless
the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer, or is authorized
by law to do so, or in criminal prosecutions, after appropriate
review by a judicial officer.
Accordingly, district courts which have adopted DR 7-104(A)(1)
should revise it as underlined:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer
shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the sub-
ject of the representation with a party he knows to be repre-
sented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior con-
sent of his lawyer representing such other party, or is
220. 624 F.2d 1140 (2nd Cir. 1980). See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
221. Mohabir involved the Sixth Amendment waiver of a defendant who did not have
counsel at the time of the waiver. 624 F.2d at 1145.
222. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
223. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 301, 302 (1988) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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authorized by law to do so, or in criminal prosecutions, after
appropriate review by a judicial officer.
Counterparts to Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104(A)(1) should be amended
similarly.
V. CONCLUSION
When applied in a criminal context, Rule 4.2 and its counter-
parts may impede a defendant's ability to initiate contacts with the
government and to waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
While the ethical prohibition offers protection to both the attorney
and the defendant, the defendant's interests are paramount. An at-
torney may be concerned about his or her own effectiveness, but this
effectiveness is part and parcel of the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights which the defendant can waive. Furthermore, a defendant
must have some way of extricating himself from an attorney-client
relationship which primarily benefits someone else or a larger organ-
ization. Particularly where an attorney has a serious conflict of inter-
est, the defendant's interests should prevail because he or she is the
one who must face the consequences of a possible conviction. Finally,
a defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation which
must be recognized and respected by the judicial system. An ethical
rule adopted by a court cannot take away a right secured by the
Constitution.
The intervention of a neutral judicial officer strikes a balance
between the defendant's right of self-representation and the legiti-
mate ethical concerns of a prosecutor communicating with a defend-
ant outside the presence and knowledge of the defendant's attorney.
This proposed amendment to Rule 4.2 and its counterparts protects
the defendant from an overreaching prosecutor by having the judicial
officer verify that the defendant indeed wishes to waive his or her
right to counsel. Additionally, the proposed amendment protects the
defendant's right to self-representation. Furthermore, if the defend-
ant seeks appointment of counsel for the purposes of meeting with
the government, then the judicial officer may effectuate this. Thus,
the proposed amendment protects the defendant's rights while pre-
serving the central principles of the ethical prohibition embodied in
Rule 4.2 and its counterparts.
Lisa M. Castor
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